\u3cem\u3eRomancing the Real\u3c/em\u3e by Baron, Jane B.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
4-1-2003
Romancing the Real
Jane B. Baron
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jane B. Baron, Romancing the Real, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 573 (2003)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol57/iss3/6
Romancing the Real
JANE B. BARON*
Legal thought (meaning the thinking that people trained as lawyers
do) has structure; it falls into predictable and describable patterns.
Although perhaps no one would own up to this idea today, some folks
once believed that understanding the structure of legal thought possibly
could lead to change in "the real world." The transformative potential
(the very phrase sounds quaint) of understanding the structure of legal
thought had two interrelated or cumulative components. The first per-
tained to one's own consciousness: Once one saw that legal arguments
were but moves, and once one learned the anatomy of such moves and
how to deploy them, one would no longer be dazzled or even mildly
persuaded into believing that any legal result (particularly a result one
found offensive) was required in any sense. Call this "liberation from
false necessity." The second way in which understanding the structure
of legal thought could be transformative was more external and strate-
gic: One could expose the guts of an opponent's arguments to demon-
strate that such arguments did not in fact prove what they purported to
prove, or that they supported conclusions directly opposite those in
whose service they had been proposed. Call this "acquisition of argu-
mentative prowess."
Pierre Schlag can slice, dice, dissect, deconstruct, expose (etc.) the
structure of legal arguments with the very best in the business; indeed,
his descriptions of the forms of legal thought may be the best in the
business. For him, though, there is no transformative potential whatever
in this skill. We cannot be liberated from false necessity and see more
clearly the way things might be because the very way in which we think
"always already" limits our (but not Schlag's?) imaginative capabilities.
Nor will our understanding of the structure of legal arguments and our
resulting argumentative prowess enable us to use legal thought critically
to defang our opponents or rebut their substantive positions. Whether
we talk doctrine, policy, or values, we, along with our opponents, play a
fundamentally empty and meaningless game with fundamentally empty
and meaningless forms. You cannot advance your cause with mere
shadows.
* Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. Thanks to Michael Fischl
for inviting me to participate in this symposium, to Pierre Schlag for listening graciously, to the
symposium participants for good ideas, and to Jeffrey Dunoff and Rick Greenstein for helpful
comments on early drafts.
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In Schlag's hands, the very idea of a critical project or of transfor-
mation seems like a pathetic joke. The thought forms in which we are
"always already" enmeshed allow us to think-worse, even to per-
ceive-only in a limited number of ways, the ways supported and gov-
erned by reason. Anything that cannot be processed within reason's
forms cannot be processed at all, or can be processed only in a way that
reason has already tamed. Because we "always already" (can Schlag
overuse this term more?) think within the narrow cabin formed by rea-
son, we have lost our capacity to question this structure. We cannot
think about it because we think in it (although Schlag can, I guess,
because he doesn't?).
Meanwhile, though the ontological status of law and its forms
remains unexplored, reality is very much out there and is very real.
Take emotions, tradition, prejudice, dogma, rent seeking, power politics,
authority, custom, convention, and force. Schlag treats these attributes
as truly authentic-until, that is, imperialist reason substitutes for the
genuine article images, proxies, and simalcrums that go by the same
name but are not the same (real) thing.
The philosophy of Schlag's position is well beyond me, but what I
will call its psychology is of great interest. Schlag's real world is largely
a world of chaos, disorder, and violence, a world masked or transformed
by the enchantments and pathologies of reason into some place we could
actually stand to live. Yet, any experience we might have of order or
rationality (or anything else positive) is dismissed as delusional, the
result of our enchantment. Nor can we testify from our own lived feel-
ings that we are not enchanted, because our own feelings of nonenchant-
ment are not reliable evidence of nonenchantment. The fact that we say
the world is good or orderly does not make it so any more than our
saying we are progressive legal thinkers makes us progressive legal
thinkers. Neither the reasons for which we might want to believe in the
possibility of order, rationality, progressivity, and the like, nor the aspi-
rations behind such concepts as the rule of law are, in Schlag's world,
even worth exploring. Self-interest, the need to believe that what one
does has a point, explains all.
Schlag is as sensitive as anyone to the extent to which the borders
bounding fields (law, phrenology) are constructed rather than natural,
the products of desires (to believe, to know, to see ourselves as doing
good) rather than elemental need. It is somewhat surprising, then, to
find Schlag defining law into a sphere distinct from the "real" brute
forces reason seeks to control.' We, of course, can think of certain
1. Of course, on this matter as on many others, Schlag is cagey, as he never exactly specifies
the connection between law and reason. On the one hand, for example, he tells us that reason is
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experiences, emotions, traditions, power relations, and so forth as
authentic, and anything we say about these forces in law as inauthentic
and distorted. This is one way of characterizing the way law works.
Once we take this step, we can define law professors as thug trainers and
judges as murderers. This is one way of defining what we and they do.
Why draw the boundaries this way? In the old days, those days to
which I alluded at the outset, law was not set apart from, but placed
firmly within, the clusters of belief that made up reality. Crest tooth-
paste prevents cavities. God is good. Private property is necessary to a
well-functioning social order. The point was not that law was a fantasy,
but that "reality" was. What we had taken to be brute reality was histor-
ical contingency, and once it was seen to be contingent, it could be
changed. Maybe this was naive; how, I can hear Schlag ask, can we
somehow stand outside our beliefs about reality long enough to change
them? But at least in this na've format, structural understanding had a
point, a purpose. It went somewhere.
Of course, Schlag rejects the need for thought to go somewhere, 2 so
to him I would guess that this is all beside the point. I will blunder
forward, nevertheless, and suggest one implication I see in Schlag's
structural description/deconstruction of legal discourse. The entire
vocabulary of law is, for those on the political left anyway, almost fully
played out. Time after time after time, we have demonstrated the
indeterminancy, shallowness, and contradiction of doctrine, process, and
policy. We may have persuaded absolutely no one on the other side
(whether that side be understood as the right or as those still convinced
that there are such things as truly legal methods). All of that is irrele-
vant, though, for we have persuaded ourselves of the vacuity of our own
language and conventions. No wonder, then, that even those who are
won over by Schlag's critique of normativity find themselves wondering
where we go from here.
ENCHANTMENTS AND DELUSIONS: A CASE STUDY
Schlag's scholarly project is on some level importantly descrip-
tive.3 This, he tells us, is what legal scholars say about law; this is what
crucially important to law because it is the formative medium though which the field of law is
organized and represented. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 16 (1998)
[hereinafter ER]. On the other hand, reason and law remain distinct in Schlag's mind; despite all
attempts, law cannot be brought into conformity with reason. Id. at 17. I have tried my best to be
clear about what Schlag claims for law and reason respectively, but since they are so often tied
together in his analysis (isn't their interconnection essential to his point?), I am not completely
confident I have gotten it fight every time.
2. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1051
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reason does (or is said to do); this is how it works (or appears to work).'
It seems important, then, to examine whether Schlag's descriptions of
legal arguments' structure, the nature of legal reasoning, are accurate.5
In this part of the paper and the one that follows, I take up this problem
in the context of zoning law, asking what the well known and widely
discussed Mt. Laurel cases might show us about Schlag's descriptive
acumen.6 Might not these cases help us answer Schlag's frequently
repeated questions about what this thing called "law" really is and
whether "it" is there at all?
The first Mt. Laurel decision,7 handed down in 1975, occupies over
thirty-five pages in the Atlantic Reporter. There must be a lot of law
here, right? The holding is perfectly clear:
[E]very [developing] municipality must, by its land use regulations,
presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and
choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot fore-
close the opportunity ... for low and moderate income housing and
in its regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least
to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and pro-
spective regional need therefor.8
The problem to which the holding was addressed was also perfectly
clear. Mt. Laurel, like virtually every other suburban community in
New Jersey, had zoned only for single family and light industrial uses;
there was no district in which multi-family housing could be built.9
There was, the court explained, good reason for this pattern:
This policy of land use regulation for a fiscal end derives from
New Jersey's tax structure, which has imposed on local real estate
most of the cost of municipal and county government and of the pri-
mary and secondary education of the municipality's children. The
latter expense is much the largest, so, basically, the fewer the school
children, the lower the tax rate. Sizeable industrial and commercial
ratables are eagerly sought and homes and the lots on which they are
situate are required to be large enough, through minimum lot sizes
and minimum floor areas, to have substantial value in order to pro-
duce greater tax revenues to meet school costs. Large families who
(2002) [hereinafter Schlag, Aesthetics] ("What I am after is the description of those recurrent
forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and identity of law.").
4. See, e.g., ER, supra note 1, at 97-106.
5. For one argument that those descriptions omit too much, and therefore cannot be accurate,
see Joanne Conaghan, Schlag in Wonderland, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 543 (2003).
6. Readers who are already convinced that Schlag sees clearly (or does not), or who are
impatient with case descriptions of all types (or with descriptions of Mt. Laurel), might want to
skip ahead to the section entitled, "But Why?"
7. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
8. Id. at 724.
9. Id. at 719-20.
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cannot afford to buy large houses and must live in cheaper rental
accommodations are definitely not wanted, so we find drastic bed-
room restrictions for, or complete prohibition of, multi-family or
other feasible housing for those of lesser income.'
Here is a real world problem: Suburban towns do not zone for housing
affordable to those of middle and low incomes. Here is a legal solution:
All towns must zone for their fair share of the regional need for such
housing.
It is well known that Mt. Laurel I did not immediately "solve" the
problem.tt In the short term, it did not produce more low and moderate
income housing in New Jersey's suburbs, and it is not even clear that it
produced changes in local zoning ordinances. Even if it had produced
substantial changes in zoning statutes, those changes on their own would
have been of little significance because permitting multi-family dwell-
ings in a given district by no means guarantees that those dwellings actu-
ally will be built.
What Mt. Laurel I unquestionably did produce was more cases.
These cases, the outgrowth of serious (and fiscally sensible) resistance
to the "big idea" of Mt. Laurel I, explored the many ambiguities in the
original holding. What was a "developing" municipality, anyway?
What was the relevant region? Who decides a region's "fair share?"
What remedies could be imposed against townships that refused to com-
ply with the Mt. Laurel I mandate? 2 The first Mt. Laurel decision, then,
produced only more decisions, each of which could be appealed (more
decisions), remanded (more decisions), and appealed (more decisions)
again.
Ultimately, what Mt. Laurel I produced was another Big Case, Mt.
Laurel II,13 which, one would imagine, would contain a truckload of
10. Id. at 723.
11. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated nearly ten yers later in the litigation's next
phase:
The Mount Laurel case itself threatens to become infamous. After all this time, ten
years after the trial court's initial order invalidating its zoning ordinance, Mount
Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance. Papered over with
studies, rationalized by hired experts, the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but
Mount Laurel's determination to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone; we
believe that there is widespread non-compliance with the constitutional mandate of
our original opinion in this case.
S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (N.J. 1983). See
also Toll Brothers, Inc. v. Township of West Windsor, 802 A.2d 53, 93 (N.J. 2002) ("Since 1983,
when Mount Laurel II was decided, approximately 480,000 residential dwelling units have been
constructed of which about 26,000 units, or 5.4 percent, constituted units affordable to low and
moderate income households.") (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. These cases are described in the second Mt. Laurel decision, S. Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 413-14 (N.J. 1983).
13. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
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law, occupying, as it does, over. 120 pages in the Atlantic Reporter. Mt.
Laurel II began with the observation that Mt. Laurel I had resulted not in
housing, but "in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals."' 4 This
experience demonstrated the need for a strong judicial hand. 15 I suppose
one could say that the opinion was indeed strong. Among other things,
the court consolidated future litigation over Mt. Laurel issues before a
limited number of judges, authorized mandatory set-asides by which
builders would be required to include a stated percentage of low and
moderate income housing in any approved development, and permitted
courts finding Mt. Laurel violations to grant "builder's remedies"
whereby developers who successfully prosecuted exclusionary zoning
claims and who promised to deliver substantial numbers of low-income
housing units would be granted permission to build additional market-
priced units over the number normally permitted by the zoning
ordinance. 16
It is not surprising that, like its predecessor, Mt. Laurel H produced
yet more cases. The opinion, or maybe it was the townships affected,
also awakened the sleeping dragon legislature, which finally enacted the
New Jersey Fair Housing Act to deal with Mt. Laurel issues.'7 The stat-
ute, the details of which need not detain us, moved exclusionary zoning
issues from the courts to a newly created administrative agency called
the Council on Affordable Housing.' 8 In addition, it produced yet
another big case, Mt. Laurel III,19 taking-up an additional forty Atlantic
Reporter pages and holding the statute to be constitutional.20
In terms of housing, what did the statute and the final opinion pro-
duce? The question is hotly debated, but the range of answers is limited
between some/a noticeable amount and none/an insignificant amount.2'
Almost no one asserts that, as a result of Mt. Laurel, New Jersey's sub-
urbs are now flush with low or even moderate income housing.
Stepping back, Mt. Laurel, in the aggregate, can be seen as illustrat-
ing Schlag's point about "law." Developers, public advocacy groups,
14. Id. at 410.
15. Id.
16. For the court's summary of its own ruling, see id. at 418-20. The nature of the builder's
remedy is lucidly explained in CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE 44-45 (1996).
17. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301-52:27D-329 (West 2002).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-307 (West 2002).
19. Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
20. Id. at 642. Just a few months ago, after this symposium was held, the New Jersey
Supreme Court decided yet another case involving the Mt. Laurel doctrine, upholding the
builder's remedy. Toll Brothers, Inc. v. Township of West Windsor, 802 A.2d 53 (N.J. 2002).
Only time can determine whether Toll Brothers will prove to be yet another Big Case.
21. For an empirical approach to this question, see Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer,
The Impact of Mt. Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and
Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268 (1997).
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and townships maniacally turned out argument after argument for or
against a "fair share" obligation. Courts, with equal energy, turned out
opinion after opinion, each with reasons or a "rationale," and, finally,
the legislature ultimately turned out a Big Statute. All of this "legal"
activity-the generation of arguments, the writing of opinions, the crea-
tion of a statute-produced nothing, related to nothing, and signified
nothing. The real world problem, consisting of a complex mixture of
racism, small town politics, and bureaucratic ineptitude was reduced to
the legally-digestible, contentless form of "exclusionary zoning." Law
then functioned as a collective delusion that we were "doing something"
about this problem by talking and writing and drafting in a certain way.
And I have not yet mentioned the professional planners and law
professors who, from the very beginning, turned out paper after paper
detailing what the advocates, courts, and legislature should do. The aca-
demic analysis of the exclusionary zoning problem in a collective num-
ber of pages could probably fill an entire series of the Atlantic Reporter.
It embodies numerous disputes over -matters ranging from the true
"source" of the Mt. Laurel obligation (was it "in" the state constitution
all along?)22 to the appropriate scope of "judicial activism" in solving
zoning problems.23 One of the more lively debates pits believers in the
virtues of local decision making against those who see the problem as
being amenable to solution solely in regional terms.24 The localist/
regionalist debate has spawned a variety of vaguely surreal proposals for
new hybrid institutions of government-between the micro level of indi-
vidual towns and the macro level of the entire state-with ingenious
schemes for voting in new regional elections. 5 The proposals, which
from the start had that wifty, "hey let's just make the world again" qual-
ity, have in today's post-September 11 era a particularly hallucinogenic
feel. That is, after we finish the war on terrorism and boost military
spending by previously unimaginable percentages, we will reconfigure
local government institutions which have almost totally depleted their
treasuries by paying overtime to police officers and converting local bus
and train stations into protectable bunkers? Maybe not.
22. See, e.g., John M. Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel 11, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 555 (2000).
23. See, e.g., HAAR, supra note 16, at 175-85.
24. Leading figures in the debate include Gerald Frug on the side (mostly) of localism (see,
e.g., Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1993); Gerald E. Frug,
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980)) and Richard Briffault on the side
(mostly) of regionalism (see, e.g., Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV.
I (2000); Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REV. I115 (1996)).
25. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843 (1994); Frug, Decentering Decentralization, supra note 24.
20031
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The (normative) form, (self-referential) substance, and (practical)
implausibility of the academic proposals regarding the now thoroughly
"legalized" problem of "exclusionary zoning" would seem to exemplify
Schlag's description of the legal mind imprisoned in reason's web. Aca-
demics prod and poke the problem from every conceivable direction,
which turns out to be one direction-the direction of "what can we do?"
They apply to the problem all manner of approaches, which turn out to
be one single approach-the approach of applying various available
legal theories. These academics then supply innumerable possible solu-
tions, not one of which holds the slightest interest to anyone outside
academia, let alone anyone actually interested in housing. Thus far,
then, on a purely descriptive level, Schlag does seem to be right.
CASE STUDY REDUX: THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF RECONSTRUCTION
Does it change anything if we think about Mt. Laurel in a slightly
different way? As an alternative, imagine a court composed of judges
familiar with, if not fully adept at, Schlag's critical stance. The "police
power," such judges might say, being but an idea, a legal construction,
cannot actually force or block actions; it cannot require or mandate any-
thing at all. Nor can the "general welfare" truly encompass or fail to
encompass, include or fail to include, any particular interest. Legal enti-
ties, these judges would understand, cannot, in reality, do things.
How would such judges explain language such as the following?
The constitutional power to zone ... is but one portion of the police
power and, as such, must be exercised for the general welfare. When
the exercise of that power by a municipality affects something as fun-
damental as housing, the general welfare includes more than the wel-
fare of that municipality and its citizens: it also includes . . . the
housing needs ... of those residing outside of the municipality but
within the region that contributes to the housing demand within the
municipality. Municipal land use regulations that conflict with the
general welfare thus defined abuse the police power ....
The judges might say: We wrote this in a "positive moment" of
jurisprudential enchantment. We were at this moment experiencing and
instantiating a "subjectivist aesthetic," in which "legal entities are cast as
the effective source of legal action [and] become personified-endowed
with the characteristics reserved for subjects: will, intention, purpose,
and even personality."27 We couldn't help ourselves, the judges might
continue, because the aesthetics in which we write are not entirely or
26. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (N.J. 1983)
(emphasis added).
27. ER, supra note 1, at 98.
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even partially within our control. Rather, they are "forms of perception,
apprehension, and expression . . . that precede (and almost always
evade) the conscious prosecution of legal or philosophical disputes on
the relation of epistemology to ontology, language to thought, ideas to
materiality (and so on)."28 Well, perhaps the judges would say some-
thing of this sort, but I kind of doubt it. Even judges with healthy skep-
ticism about whether the "police power" or the "general welfare" has
any determinate content or decisional power might decline to defend Mt.
Laurel by citing their own enchantment by or enslavement to precon-
sciously operating ideas. They might believe that there was a method to
their apparent madness. Let us call this method "expressivism."
Generalizing broadly and eliding certain academic controversies, 9
expressive theories of law focus less on what law "does," i.e., law's
material consequences, than on what law "says," i.e., the messages and
signals law sends.3" Law, in other words, can "make a statement," and a
judge might be seriously concerned with the statement made in a partic-
ular case.
In this light, consider the position of the judges who heard the vari-
ous arguments in the Mt. Laurel cases. They might have had a pretty
good idea that, without dramatic changes in local tax and school finance
structures, the imposition of a "fair share" obligation would actually
change little. They might also have been sufficiently influenced by legal
realism (whether they called it that or not) to understand that the con-
cepts "police power" and "general welfare" could not and did not, of
their own intrinsic power, mandate a fair share obligation, a builder's
remedy, or even a decision in the plaintiffs' favor. Such judges might,
nonetheless, have felt the need to say something about exclusionary zon-
ing. A holding that such zoning is permissible expresses an attitude of
tolerance, if not outright approval, of economic and urban/suburban seg-
regation. Conversely, a holding that such zoning is impermissible
expresses disapproval, if not outrage, at both exclusionary practices and
the self-regarding, parochial reasons that tend to be offered in support of
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Expression,"
and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
30. For overviews, see Jane B. Baron, The Expressive Transparency of Property, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 208 (2002); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
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those practices. A court concerned enough to express this sort of disap-
proval and outrage might therefore assert that the general welfare
"includes" extra-municipal interests and that land use regulations
"abuse" police power without actually believing that these concepts
could actually do any such things. The point of such an opinion would
be to clarify the values implicated by the zoning practices at issue and
endorse some (the inclusion values) while condemning others (the
exclusionary values).
I, of course, have no idea whether the judges of the New Jersey
Supreme Court actually had expression in mind when they wrote the Mt.
Laurel opinions, but assuming they did, would this expressivist interpre-
tation rescue the case from Schlag's enchantment critique? I am ninety-
nine percent confident that the answer is "no." All the expressivist
viewpoint does is move the problem of the subjectivist aesthetic to a
higher level of abstraction. Rather than rules "talking," "requiring," or
otherwise "governing," in expressive theories, "the law," either gener-
ally or as embodied in a particular opinion, "speaks," "conveys," and
"signals." The nature of this "law," the source of authority for these
"opinions," remains unexamined. Also remaining unexamined is the
assumption shared by the judges and their legal audience alike that there
must be a purpose to their work, and that their purpose is rational-in
this case the rational purpose being the expression of something about
the acceptability of exclusionary zoning. Expressivism as an escape
from the enchantment of reason? Not a chance. To the contrary,
expressivism just instantiates the enchantment in another guise. Once
again, on a descriptive plane, Schlag seems right.
BUT WHY?
There is, however, something curious about Schlag's theories. As
far as enchantment goes, there is not much to distinguish the Mt. Laurel
cases from, say, Bowers v. Hardwick.3 Aren't Mt. Laurel and Bowers
alike based on the same unreflective premise that controversial issues
must be approached and resolved rationally, that law is rational, and that
it makes sense to try to deal with the complex constellation of forces
involved in disputes over exclusionary zoning and homosexuality by ref-
erence to law? Indeed, as far as enslavement to reason goes, there might
not be much to distinguish the actual Mt. Laurel cases condemning
exclusionary zoning from a hypothetical trio of Mt. Laurel cases endors-
ing such zoning. Insofar as the court in Anti-Mt. Laurel relied on reified
concepts such as "the police power," "the general welfare," "the Consti-
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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tution," or "the power of the court," a decision upholding exclusionary
zoning would be no better and no worse than the original decisions,
which also attributed animistic or fetishistic force to these concepts.
Thus Mt. Laurel and its evil twin could both properly be characterized as
products of delusions about the power of ontologically suspect entities
(legal doctrines, policies, and so forth) and the connection of these enti-
ties to the world outside the legal "grid."
I am probably just naive, but I am not sure why I would want to see
the actual Mt. Laurel decisions as delusional. The answer, I suppose, is
that what I want has nothing to do with the matter in hand; wanting law
to be meaningful, good, or progressive will not, of its own accord, make
law any of these things, though it gives us ample reason to persuade
ourselves that law is already all of them.3" Still, is it not worth asking
what is the point of an analysis that makes a mockery of every aspect of
Mt. Laurel?
Well, what is the analysis, anyway? Schlag concerns himself with
the connection between form and substance.33 Schlag is, of course, not
the first to take an interest in the relationship between form and sub-
stance in legal thought,34 but Schlag has his own "take" on the form/
substance issue. Legal form, he asserts, drains ideas, insights, urges,
dreams, and so on, of any power, interest, or energy they might other-
wise have had. Indeed, life-drain, enervation-these are the critical, if
not defining, features of the legal form.35
Why is it important to see this? Clarity on this point will most
certainly not help us reinvigorate legal thought, and the attempt to use it
for this purpose is simply to run once more in the empty circle in which
reason imprisons US. 3 6 Nor will it help us change anything in the world,
for another signal feature of legal thought is its inability to connect to
32. See ER, supra note 1, at 55 (describing the "strikingly odd, yet pervasive belief that
human life and human law must always already be responsive to normative desires for reason,
order, progress, and the like").
33. See id.
34. For example, I would be shocked if there were any participants in this symposium who
are not familiar with Duncan Kennedy's Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
35. See infra text accompanying note 37.
36. Indeed, to attempt to use our insights in any way would enact what Schlag calls the
"progressive fallacy," i.e., "the belief that the aspects of a practice (say, law) that are 'good' are
constitutive of or essential to the practice, while those aspects of the practice that are 'bad' are
merely by-products of or contingent to the practice." ER, supra note 1, at 99. Schlag asserts that
there is no reason to believe in this cheery scenario or its "progressive corollary," which holds that
"intellectual effort can be usefully deployed to reform the practice so as to eliminate the bad
aspects." Id. All that the progressive fallacy and the progressive corollary have going for them, in
Schlag's view, is "a faith in cheery scenarios." Id.
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
anything in the world. It is on this point that Schlag most distinguishes
himself from earlier critical legal thinking.
To see this point, consider the following three excerpts from The
Enchantment of Reason:
In American law, ... considerable effort is expended to make
* . . sources of belief [other than reason] more like reason itself.
... The process of rationalization transforms the manifold meanings
of authority, of experience, tradition, perception, and other sources of
belief into the ordered propositional aesthetic of reason....
Indeed, in the rationalization process the hold of experience (as
experience), tradition (as tradition), perception (as perception) is typi-
cally degraded. And it is easy to see how: to the extent that the
raison d'etre for experience, tradition, and perception becomes their
conformity to reason, they lose their intrinsic power. The foreign
criteria of reason such as coherence and consistency come to displace
experience and perception. When rationalization has completed its
work, all sources of belief must be redeemed in the court of reason. 37
Now, this view [that the field of law is rational] is taken for
granted by virtually all American legal thinkers-even though it is,
once one thinks about it, a controversial (if not improbable) presump-
tion. Why, after all, would one presume that the interested actions of
state agents (known as judges) attempting to resolve difficult disputes
in circumstances of serious information deprivation and strategic
behavior would be ruled by reason or rationality? Why in particular
would one presume that such adjudication would exhibit rationality
when indeed the laws that inform this adjudication are often the prod-
uct of rent seeking, power politics, outright deceit, and other ques-
tionable strategic behaviors? 38
After all, in law, reason confronts significant competition as a
source of belief. There are authority, tradition, custom, convention,
force, power, experience, emotion, faith, dogma, and so on.... How
did they come to be subordinated to reason? Similarly, in law, reason
confronts hostile worlds-worlds hostile to the very possibility of
reason itself. These are the worlds of radical pluralism, or radical
incommensurability, worlds of paradoxes and undecidabilities,
worlds resistant to identity thinking. How is it that reason has van-
quished its competitors and established its rightful rule?39
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id. at 39.
39. Id. at 40.
[Vol. 57:573
ROMANCING THE REAL
In each of these paragraphs, reason is defined by contrast to other
qualities. The reader will pardon me for appropriating a Schlagian tech-
nique and just listing them. In the first excerpt they are:
authority
experience
tradition
perception
In the second excerpt they are:
rent seeking
power politics
outright deceit
other questionable strategic behaviors
In the third excerpt the list is really long:
authority
tradition
custom
convention
force
power
experience
emotion
faith
dogma
worlds of radical pluralism, or radical incommensurability
worlds of paradoxes and undecidabilities
worlds resistant to identity thinking
All of these qualities-until subdued by the flattening and enervating
effects of reason-have an authenticity, a reality, that Schlag never
accords to law.
Compare this to the following statement from Bob Gordon's oft-
cited and remarkably lucid essay in David Kairy's book, The Politics of
Law: "Legal discourses don't just mask the realities of power and life,
but participate in constructing those realities."4
To take a simple example used by Gordon in his original essay and
more recently by Joseph Singer in two new books,4' a property dis-
course centered around "ownership" will create one reality of property
rights, a reality, in which owners are perceived to have very low levels
40. Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). Some version of Gordon's
essay that includes this language has been in the book since the first edition.
41. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP (2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY
(2000).
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of duty to others and very high levels of independence from the state. A
different discourse of property, centered around "obligation," will create
a different reality, in which owners are understood always to owe duties
to others and always to depend on the state for the protection of their
rights.42
The larger point is this: If Gordon's observation is true, then all of
the qualities in the lists above, qualities Schlag contrasts to reason and
law, could themselves be cast as, in some measure, products of law.43
They have no independent life or power that law can deplete or tame,
but instead take whatever life or power they have from law itself.
Changes in law, one could infer, might change reality.
Now, I do not wish to make too much of the Schlag-Gordon con-
trast on the issue of reality. As his earlier work attests, Schlag is too
much the post-modernist to "believe in" reality at the crude level the
lists reflect. In his recently published The Aesthetics of American Law,
Schlag refers not to facts but to "fact-fields" (his quotation marks); facts,
he points out, always come already characterized and shaped.44 On the
older critical legal studies side, I am also not sure how confident anyone
ever was about the ability of law to define reality wholesale. Even way
back when Gordon wrote his original essay, he hedged, lumping law
with religion and television as but one of the many "clusters of belief...
that convince people that all the many hierarchical relations in which
they live and work are natural and necessary."45 The contrast between
the view of facts as law-independent and the view of facts as law-depen-
dent should not be overdrawn.
Yet, imagine that what Gordon said were true. There would be an
easily discemable point to doing what we legal academics (and isn't
Schlag one of us?) do. If legal conceptions and the social world were
connected in some way, then thinking about law would also be a way of
thinking about the material world, and trying to change the way we think
about law-for instance, to use my earlier example, trying to convince
people that property need not be modeled on ownership but on obliga-
tion-would be a way of trying to change the material world. Question-
ing what legal doctrine foregrounds and backgrounds, 46 revealing
"nested oppositions" in legal rules,47 and all manner of similar analyses
42. See Baron, supra note 30.
43. For Gordon's statement of this idea, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REV. 57, 102-13 (1984).
44. Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 3, at 1103.
45. Gordon, supra note 40, at 648.
46. For more on this technique, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 244-63
(1997).
47. See generally J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990).
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of the patterns and structure of standard legal argumentation, including
the kinds of analyses Schlag himself has so often performed (consider
The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification48 ), would, or could, at least
potentially be useful; if we could see and make others see how we our-
selves artificially "froze" reality, we could unfreeze it.49 At the very
least, we could begin to think about changing it because we would no
longer be victims of belief in reality's immutability."
Twenty-plus years of engaging in various versions of this practice
have revealed how much more complicated all this is than it originally
seemed. From Stanley Fish we learned how silly it might be to envision
standing outside one's own structures of belief in order to change
them.5 From feminists and critical race theorists we learned that "we"
might not be "we," but multiple intersecting and overlapping "we's"
with potentially differing interests and engagements.5 ' From law and
society folks we learned to question whether there was any relation
between lawyers' and judges' ideas about law and actual social prac-
tices; if there was little relation to begin with, changes in legal con-
sciousness (even if "we" could actually effect such changes) would be
unlikely to have much impact on everyday behaviors. 3
None of this proves that legal change and social change are impos-
sible, only that effecting social change through law is considerably more
difficult and chancy than first had been thought. One could see, how-
ever, why it might be worth trying to solve (or work around) the
problems: thinking about law would still be a way-perhaps now a more
nuanced, humbled way-of trying to fix what was wrong with the
world.
This strategy would not work, of course, if "the world" is intracta-
bly out there, isolated from and immune to thought. That is exactly as
Schlag presents the world in those excerpts and in the lists culled from
them. The question is why, knowing better-that is, having no illusions
about a pure factuality unmediated by perspective or shaping-Schlag
would choose to portray "reality" that way.
48. Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1997).
49. For a description of hopes along these lines, see Jane B. Baron, The Undersell: An Essay
on Duncan Kennedy's A Critique of Adjudication, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 797, 805-07 (2001).
50. Id. at 807.
51. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 322-23 (1989) (discussing "theory
hope").
52. See Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581 (1990) (discussing essentialism).
53. See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (exploring the complex relationship between law on the books and the
way law is experienced and used outside formal legal settings).
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LAW AS AN EMPTY Box
Rhetorically, Schlag's opposition constructs law as an empty box,
or perhaps a box filled only with reason, which, given reason's funda-
mental emptiness, is the same thing. Emotion, tradition, power, deceit,
and so on, in their authentic forms, are somewhere else-they are inde-
pendent. Law never really gets them, in their authentic versions, into its
big tent; if they show up under that big top, it is after they have been
brutalized by reason into mere parodies of their true selves. So, to
restate the question, why an empty box?
One aspect of this conceptualization is that it helps highlight the
question of power in law. How can an empty box "rule," "govern,"
"control," "mandate," "police," "organize," "require," "guard against,"
or do any of the thousands of other things law is supposed to do? Schlag
loves nothing more than an absurd verb, and his construction of law
renders almost all verbs used about the subject absurd.
Although Schlag's construction is genuinely annoying ("Dammit, I
really cannot find a non-absurd verb!"), this aspect of his analysis
seems, alas, a direct legacy of the left's relentless critiques of "legal"
reasoning. Imagine that one has shown that concepts such as "corpora-
tions" cannot credibly "reside" in one place rather than another;54 that
rules, because of their vagueness or propensity to be swallowed by their
exceptions, cannot "determine" outcomes; 55 that polices such as "secur-
ity of transactions" can be enlisted in aid of equal and opposite results
even in relatively simple cases and thus do not really "support" anything
at all.56 If one has shown all these and countless other pathologies of
legal reasoning, it should come as no surprise that "law," the amalgam
of these discredited concepts, rules, policies, and pathologies, cannot be
said credibly to "do" much either. "Their" vocabulary-the vocabulary
of the right, of believers in objectivity, process, and other comforting
bromides-turned out to be "our" vocabulary, too, and to the extent we
continue to use it (and how could we not?) we sound as vacuous as those
we critique.
This is an important observation, and one would think it would be
widely celebrated. After all, critics on the left have been tilting at the
law/politics distinction for decades now, and a convincing demonstra-
tion that the vocabulary of law is not worth using would seem to pave
54. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809 (1935).
55. Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1 (1984).
56. Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 195 (1987).
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the way for a far more direct, open, and illuminating debate about polit-
ics. In other words, it may be that Schlag employs the empty box to, in
effect, embarrass us into stopping all this silly and discredited "law"
talk. That would seem a worthy goal, so why does Schlag's work get
people so mad?
One of many answers might lie in those lists set out earlier. In the
first, recall, reason was contrasted to
authority
experience
tradition
perception
In the second, the contrasting qualities were
rent seeking
power politics
outright deceit
other questionable strategic behaviors
Whatever might be said about the first list, the qualities in the second are
pretty frightening. One could be pardoned for wishing that there might
be some mechanism to control them. This wish, of course, is just a
micro version of the ideals behind "the rule of law," as Schlag is well
aware. "Reason," he explains, is understood by believers in the rule of
law to be a "disciplining mechanism" that can constrain and control dan-
gerous human motivations such as self-interest, vengeance, and hate, as
well as modes of interaction such as power, prejudice, arbitrariness, and
sloth.57
Schlag openly confronts the stakes riding on this image. Stripped
of reason and the rule of law, the legal system would be reduced to "an
assortment of legal actors, judges, and lawyers who practice ritualized
forms of violence on each other and on other people."58 "As for legal
academics," he continues, "they are demoted to the status of thug-train-
ers."59 Of course all this has a psychological dimension as well, involv-
ing "the surrender of the professional self to all manner of
uncontrollable forces. ' 6°
Having nodded to hopes and fears that underlie the rule of law
ideal, Schlag proceeds to a remorseless demonstration of the instability,
circularity, and implausibility of the claims made on its behalf.6 Of
course, the idea that the rule of law cannot actually constrain power has
57. ER, supra note 1, at 20.
58. Id. at 21.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., ER, supra note 1, at 39, 117. See also Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91
MICH. L. REV. 2053 (1993).
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a long and distinct pedigree in critical theory. What particularly charac-
terizes Schlag's version of the critique is its apparently complete con-
tempt for any of the impulses, fears, or aspirations that might lead any
individual or community of thinkers to want something like the rule of
law.62
Schlag dismisses desires for qualities such as order, control, or
meaning as "pathological,"63 and even "comical. '64 Take, for example,
the urge for a state that is strong enough to protect individuals from
selfish others but still somehow limited in its capacity to threaten indi-
vidual freedom. It is one thing to say, as earlier rule-of-law skeptics did,
that an urge of this variety is understandable, but, sadly, impossible to
achieve.65 It is quite another thing to mock the urge itself, to ignore it,
or to attribute it and others like it to "disciplinary solipsism. 66
I suppose it is not altogether surprising that, in dealing with the
psychological aspects of the rule of law ideal, Schlag focuses almost
entirely on the professional's need to "believe in" the rule of law as a
means of evading the possibility that his or her work is empty and point-
less. The "selves" in Schlag's works are thin, abstract creatures, defined
mostly by (professional) role: legal actors, law students, judges, academ-
ics, and so forth. Gender? Race? Emotions? Neuroses? Sexual orien-
tation? The "actors" in Schlag's work do not have any. At one point in
time, this approach-abstract, bloodless, impersonal-would have been
considered distinctly gendered; would a woman write this way? Be that
as it may, the approach certainly leaves an awful lot out, and that may
explain why Schlag's work is hard to love. Why would you even try to
engage with the ideas of someone who finds your hopes and fears
pathetic and laughable, who thinks "you" have been constructed by rea-
son to ask meaningless questions and be comforted by circular answers?
SHALLOW IN/SHALLOW OUT?
In his conclusion, Schlag asserts:
The rationalist aesthetic reduces understandings and capacities
to mere "positions," "methods," "theories" that one is supposed to
choose. This is no small thing. To the extent intellectual and social
culture is screened and formated in the image of the rationalist aes-
62. Jeremy Paul has made this observation as well. Jeremy Paul, Beyond Reason and
Interest, 57 U. MIAM! L. REV. 593 (2003).
63. ER, supra note 1, at 117.
64. Id. at 119.
65. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L.
REV. 205 (1979); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393
(1991).
66. ER, supra note 1, at 5-6, 11.
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thetic, we lose depth, dimension, and contrast. Ultimately, cultural
and individual memory are erased. . . . Ultimately, our mode of
thought itself becomes shallow. And when this is the case, there is
not a thing that thought, as such, can do about it: shallow in/shallow
out. The rationalist aesthetic becomes the frame within which
thought occurs. The more it succeeds, the more it obliterates every-
thing else.67
Here again we have definition by opposition. On the one side, there is
"the rationalist aesthetic," and on the other there are
understandings
capacities
intellectual and social culture
depth
dimension
contrast
cultural and individual memory
Schlag goes deep into the rationalist aesthetic, and his description
of it is hard to fault. The contrasting terms, on the other hand, are pretty
underdeveloped. The richness that reason is said to flatten is only thinly
described. Everything worth wanting seems to be on the list; certainly it
is hard to see why anyone would want to live within the rationalist aes-
thetic. Because of the latter, however, we can never-or perhaps no
longer?-get to the former. The game here seems seriously rigged. I,
for one, just don't want to play.
67. ER, supra note 1, at 143.
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